CHAPTER II.

i this chapter are contained all the grounds of reason for the Athe* istic hypothesis.—1. That the Democritic philosophy, which is made up of these two principles, Corporealism and Atomism complicated together, is essentially Atheistical.—2, Though Epicurus, who was an Atomical Corporealist, pretended to assert a democracy of gods, yet lie was, for all that, an absolute Atheist; and that Atheists commonly equivocate and disguise themselves.—3. That the Demo-critical philosophy is nothing else hut a system of A theology, or Atheism swaggering: under the glorious appearance of philosophy. Ami, though there be another form of Atheism, which we call Strategical, yet the Democritic Atheism is only considerable; all whose dark mysteries will be here revealed.~4. That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed stuff of Atheists in order to a confutation, the Divine assistance and direction ought to be implored.'—5. That there are two things here to be performed; first, to shew what are the Atheists' pretended grounds of reason against the Deity; and, secondly, how they endeavour either to solve or confute the contrary phenomena. The first of those grounds, that no man can haw an idea or conception of God, and that he is an incomprehensible nothing.—* 6. The second Atheistic argument, that there can be no creation cmt of nothing, nor no omnipotence, because nothing can eonae From nothing; and, therefore, whatsoever substantially L% was from eternity self-existent, and uncreated by any Deity.-—7. The third JHTC-tended reason against a Deity, that the strictest notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no such incorporeal Deity, because there is no other substance but body.—8. The Atheists* pretence, that the doctrine of incorporeal substances sprung[1] from a ridiculous mistaking of abstract names and notions for realities. They impudently make the Deity to be but the chief of spectres, and au Oberou or prince of fairies and fancies. Their fourth argument against a Deity, that to suppose an incorporeal mind to bo the original of all things, is but to make a mere accident and abstract notion to be the first cause of all.—9. Their fifth argument; a confutation of a corporeal Deity from the principles of Corporcalism